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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

U.S. Bank first set forth its statement of the case in its Appellant's Brief at 1-24. U.S. Bank
hereby incorporates into this brief the defined terms originally set forth in its Appellant's Brief.
Likewise, as in the Appellant's Brief, the Clerk's Record on Appeal is cited herein as "R.;" the
Reporter's Transcript on Appeal is cited as "Tr.;" and the exhibits admitted at the trial are cited as
"Ex."

ISSUES ON APPEAL

CitiMortgage has filed its Respondent's Brief asserting its arguments with regard to the
following issues presented by U.S. Bank's appeal:
A.

Did the District Court commit clear error by finding that U.S. Bank actually received the
Release Demand Letter from Blaine County Title?

B.

Was the Release Demand Letter ineffective as a demand for reconveyance for failure to
comply with IDAHO CODE (LC.)§ 45-1203?
ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL

In addition to those issues presented by U.S. Bank's appeal, the following issues have been
presented by CitiMortgage on cross-appeal:
A.

Did the District Court err in denying Ci ti Mortgage an award of its attorneys' fees?

B.

Is CitiMortgage entitled to an award of its attorneys' fees and costs on appeal?
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL

A.

Is U.S. Bank entitled to an award of its attorneys' fees and costs on cross-appeal?

APPELLANT-CROSS RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF

-I-

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL
The appropriate standard ofreview regarding the issues presented by U.S. Bank's appeal has
been previously set forth in Appellant's Brief at 24-25.
CitiMortgage' s cross-appeal focuses on whether its application for attorneys' fees was
properly denied by the District Court. The appropriate standard of review was stated by this Court in
Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 (2006):
The district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision,
subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. To determine whether the trial
court abused its discretion, this Court considers ( 1) whether the trial court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable
to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.
When the award of attorney fees depends on the interpretation of a statute giving rise
to that award, however, a different standard of review applies. The interpretation of
a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Where
the language of a statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute will govern
and there is no need to consult extrinsic evidence.
Id. at 576, 130 P.3d at 1114 (internal citations omitted).

ARGUMENT
For the reasons set forth hereinafter, U.S. Bank respectfully requests (1) that the Court
reverse the District Court's ruling that U.S. Bank's deed of trust be subordinated to that of
CitiMortgage; (2) that the Court affirm the District Court's denial ofCitiMortgage's attorney's fees;
(3) deny CitiMortgage an award of its attorney's fees and costs on appeal; and (4) award U.S. Bank
it's attorney's fees and costs incurred in responding to CitiMortgage's cross-appeal.
U.S. Bank now responds to the arguments set forth in CitiMortgage's Respondent's Brief:
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A.

The District Court erred in failing to consider U.S. Bank's evidence of what images
with staple holes would look like.
The District Court failed to consider crucial relevant evidence adduced by U.S. Bank as to

what stapled check images look like. These images of stapled checks created by U.S. Bank's check
imaging system were attached as exhibits "C" and "D" to the AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH POWERS IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF U.S. BANK'S SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Powers
Affidavit"). See R. 636-53.
CitiMortgage incorrectly contends that the Powers Affidavit and its exhibits were "not
evidence at trial." Respondent's Brief at 14. However, as previously explained in U.S. Bank's
Appellant's Brief, at the outset of the trial, the parties stipulated that all affidavits, exhibits, and
documents submitted by both U.S. Bank and CitiMortgage in the case prior to trial would be
admitted into evidence and considered by the District Court in reaching its findings. See Tr. I 18120. Counsel for CitiMortgage explicitly agreed to this:
The Court:

And, Ms. Pickens, do you wish to make a record or comment on the
documents?

Ms. Pickens:

I do, Your Honor. Thank You.
I just want it to be clear that the record will include all of those
affidavits and documents that have been submitted, along with
the affidavits at the motion for summary judgment stage of this
case where the Court has made specific orders on those issues, and
that rather than having to reintroduce those exhibits into this trial, the
Court will consider those exhibits as attached to the affidavits when
deciding this matter.

The Court:

That I'm going to consider the exhibits attached to the affidavits
that have already been presented and filed?

Ms. Pickens: That is correct, Your Honor.
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118: 10-24 (emphasis added); see also Tr. 119-20 (emphasizing that all previous exhibits
submitted for both parties to be part of trial record and to be considered by District Court).
Accordingly, the Powers Affidavit and its exhibits were indeed evidence at trial that the
District Court was required to consider. The District Court erred in failing to do so.

B.

The District Court erred in relying on facts not in the record when it found that U.S.
Bank's imaging machinery could have refilled the staple holes.
There is no evidence in the record to suggest that U.S. Bank's imaging machinery might

cause staple holes on imaged checks to be refilled. Therefore it was improper for the District Court
to rely on that notion in rendering its decision.
CitiMortgage's argues that it was reasonable for the Court to infer that U.S. Bank's imaging
machinery might cause the holes to be refilled because Mr. Powers testified that it was "possible" for
a staple hole to be refilled by folded paper, and CitiMortgage contends that Ms. Pearson's
experiment established the same.
CitiMortgage' s reasoning is flawed because ( 1) possibility is not tantamount to probability;
(2) Ms. Pearson's experiment established neither the possibility nor the probability that paper might
be pushed back into staple holes and thereby render the holes invisible on an imaged check; (3) there
is absolutely no evidence that U.S. Bank's imaging machinery might cause this to occur; and (4) the
only testimony in the record establishes that even if this did occur, the holes would still be visible on
the Check Images.
With regard to Mr. Powers' testimony, at the threshold it is critical to view this testimony as
a whole, recognizing that the parameters of Mr. Powers' testimony are defined by Mr. Powers'
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unwavering opinion that the images of the Check do not demonstrate the existence of staple holes.

See Tr. 185:11-15. Mr. Powers' conclusion, informed by his unrivaled knowledge and experience
regarding banking industry check imaging systems (and in particular U.S. Bank's check imaging
system) was that in all probability the Check was not stapled.
The possibility that a tom shard of paper might be folded back to cover a hole is not
ultimately relevant because CitiMortgage did not adduce any corroborating evidence to suggest that
it was probable. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. IDAHO RULE OF EVIDENCE (I.R.E.) 401.
In order to meet one's burden of proof, one must establish by the evidence that an event was
more probable than not. Erikson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 97 Idaho 288,293,543 P.2d 841, 846
(1975); see also Lundstrom v. Brekke Enterprises, Inc., 115 Idaho 156, 162, 765 P.2d 667,673
(1988) (jury instruction requiring issue of causation to be established with probability, not mere
possibility, correctly stated burden of proof in products liability case). Evidence which does not
make a fact of consequence more or less probable is not relevant. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236,
241, 220 P.3d 1055, 1060 (2009). Evidence which merely amounts to an inference of possibility is
not relevant. See id. ("Mere inferences that another person could have committed the crime will
most likely not be relevant, and ifrelevant will still be subject to the limitation provisions of I.R.E.
403.") (emphasis in original). See also Neefeldv. Browning Ferris Indus., 109 Idaho 899,902, 712
P.2d 600, 603 (1985) (worker's compensation claimant "must establish a probable not merely a
possible connection between cause and effect to support his contention that he suffered an
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accident

Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129,140,219 P.3d 453,464 (2009) (expert medical

testimony must be based upon probability

mere possibility is insufficient).

In this instance, CitiMortgage did not present any evidence to develop the possibility that the
paper refilled the holes into a probability. CitiMortgage inaccurately contends that the testimony of
Shannon Pearson regarding her experiment serves this purpose. Even if Ms. Pearson's testimony
was admissible or relevant, which U.S. Bank disputes, it had no bearing upon the likelihood of paper
to refill staple holes. Nowhere in Ms. Pearson's testimony is this notion discussed. At no time did
Ms. Pearson explain or opine why staple holes are not visible on the images of the Pickens Law
checks generated by Ms. Pearson in her experiment ("Pickens Checks," see Defendant's Ex. 516).
Ms. Pearson did not testify whether paper shards had refilled the holes of the Pickens Checks. Nor,
of course, did Ms. Pearson use a machine even remotely similar to banking industry check imaging
equipment to generate the Pickens Checks. Thus her testimony has absolutely no bearing upon the
likelihood that paper shards might refill staple holes on the Check or that U.S. Bank's imaging
machinery might have caused that to occur.
In fact, there is absolutely no testimony or evidence in the record to suggest that U.S. Bank's
imaging system might cause paper shards to be pressed back into staple holes. The only evidence
regarding the physical passage of checks through U.S. Bank's imaging system is Mr. Powers' trial
testimony. See Tr. 135-136. At no time during direct examination or cross-examination did Mr.
Powers discuss the potential for U.S. Bank's imaging system to cause physical changes to the check.
See Tr. 123-186.
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The only testimony in the record on this topic states that even if tom paper was folded back
into the staple holes, those holes would still be visible on U.S. Bank's imaging system:

Q.

[Ms. Pickens] Could there be a situation where once a staple is removed, the
paper folds back and covers up the hole?

A.

[Mr. Powers] I suppose it's possible.

Q.

Which would mean that there would be no light going through where the hole
was originally made; correct?

A.

No, I would disagree with that.

Tr. 176:01-07 (emphasis added). Mr. Powers' answer went uncontradicted. "[U]ncontradicted
testimony of a credible witness must be accepted by the trier of fact unless the testimony is
inherently improbable or impeached in some way." State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288,295, 955 P.2d
603,610 (Ct. App. 1997).
It was CitiMortgage's burden to prove that the Release Demand Letter was most probably
delivered and, given the undisputed evidence that BCT "always" stapled checks and demand letters,
it was therefore CitiMortgage's burden to prove that the Check was most probably stapled. Of
course it is possible, that a tom shard of paper might be folded back to cover a hole. It is also
conceivable, although seemingly unlikely, that both holes might be perfectly and simultaneously
covered in this manner. Mr. Powers testified that this latter notion is, in fact, improbable that even
if the paper folded back, the light from the imaging machinery would still shine through, thereby
revealing the holes on the Check Images.

If the trier of fact is to resort to the realm of infinite possibility, then it must consider that it is
equally possible that the Release Demand Letter was dropped or stolen or carried away by the wind
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prior to reaching its destination. Ultimately CitiMortgage failed to present the District Court any
evidence that any given possibility was more likely than not. In the absence of any evidence
corroborating or even suggesting the likelihood of such events, these possibilities are simply not
relevant.
Accordingly, the District Court had no reasonable basis to infer that U.S. Bank's imaging
hardware actively concealed staple holes and its conclusion was purely speculation. A district
court's findings must be supported by substantial and competent evidence. Kennedy v. Schneider,
151 Idaho 440,442,259 P.3d 586, 588 (2011). Findings which rely on facts not in the record cannot
be based on substantial and competent evidence.
C.

The District Court did not properly allocate to CitiMortgage the burden of proving its
affirmative defense of delivery of the Release Demand Letter.

The District Court erred in its handling of the burden of proof in this case because it did not
properly allocate CitiMortgage the burden of proving its own affirmative defense. See Appellant's
Brief at 29-33.
CitiMortgage ostensibly agrees that the District Court did, in fact, allocate the burden of
proving non-delivery to U.S. Bank. However CitiMortgage contends that the District Court properly
did so because U.S. Bank pleaded that the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust was superior to that of
CitiMortgage, thus placing the onus of proving superiority upon U.S. Bank. See Respondent's Brief
at 18. This argument misapprehends the nature of a judicial foreclosure action and the obligations
assumed by a party who asserts an affirmative defense.
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CitiMortgage is correct that, as plaintiff, U.S. Bank bore the burden of establishing its right to
judicially foreclose on its deed of trust. However, to establish a prima facie case for judicial
foreclosure a plaintiff must merely to prove (1) the existence of the duly-recorded and executed
security instrument and underlying obligation and (2) the borrower's default in payment on the
obligation. See I.C. § 6-101; LC.§§ 45-1503, 45-1505, 45-1506. It is undisputed that U.S. Bank
proved these elements and thus established its prima facie claim for judicial foreclosure.
When CitiMortgage, in its ANSWER, asserted the affirmative defense that its deed of trust is
senior to that of U.S. Bank because the U.S. Bank Line of Credit had been satisfied (see R. 30-34;

see also Appellant's Brief at 5, n.3) it assumed the burden of proving its affirmative. See, e.g.,
Harman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 Idaho 719,721,429 P.2d 849,851 (1967).
However, even if U.S. Bank did bear the initial burden of proving priority of the U.S. Bank
Deed of Trust over the CitiMortgage Deed of Trust, U.S. Bank did so. U.S. Bank established that
the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust was recorded prior to the CitiMortgage Deed of Trust. This evidence of
prior recording is prima facie evidence that the U.S. Bank Deed of Trust is senior to the laterrecorded CitiMortgage Deed of Trust. See LC.§ 31-2412, LC.§ 45-1510.
CitiMortgage also contends that the District Court properly allocated to U.S. Bank the burden
of proving non-delivery of the Release Demand Letter because LC.§§ 45-1514 and 45-915 impose a
duty to release to a deed of trust upon satisfaction and delivery of demand. This argument is
unavailing because these statutes have no bearing upon the burden of proof. The burden ofrelease
under the statutes and the evidentiary burden of proof are wholly distinct concepts. Further, by the
very terms of LC.§§ 45-1514 and 45-915, the burden of releasing a deed of trust under is only
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triggered after demand has been made. Thus even if the burden of release were tantamount to the
burden of proof, which it is not, that burden was not been triggered because CitiMortgage did not
met its burden of proving that it delivered a demand for reconveyance.
More critically, however, CitiMortgage misinterprets this issue as being an issue of if and
when the burden ofproofshifted. CitiMortgage argues that "[b ]ecause CitiMortgage met its burden
of proof that it delivered the Release Demand Letter, the burden of proof shifts to U.S. Bank to prove
that its demand was not made and it was not put on notice." Respondent's Brief at 19 (emphasis
added). In essence, CitiMortgage argues that the burden of proof shifted to U.S. Bank because
CitiMortgage satisfied its own burden of proving delivery. This argument puts the cart before the
horse.
U.S. Bank agrees that indeed CitiMortgage did have the burden of proving delivery.
However, the point at which the burden might shift is irrelevant. 1 The point is that the burden was
rightly CitiMortgage's but the District Court failed to so allocate it. See Appellant's Brief at 29-33.
Where the trial court has failed to correctly allocate the burden of proof, the reviewing court will
remand for proceedings applying the correct legal standard. See, e.g., State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534,
537, 164 P.3d 814,817 (2007).

D.

The District Court erred in admitting and considering the testimony of Ms. Pearson;
her testimony was not relevant and her experiment was incomparable to the actual
event.
The testimony of Shannon Pearson was irrelevant and inadmissible because she was

1 Since CitiMortgage at no time met its burden, the Court need not consider whether the burden then shifted under the
statutes. However, even if U.S. Bank bore the burden of proving non-delivery of the Release Demand Letter, it met this
burden by a preponderance of the evidence. See infra, p. 18; see also Appellant's Brief at 8-23, 26-27, 40-42.
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testifying not as a fact witness, but rather as to her check-imaging experiment which was conducted
under wholly different circumstances than the imaging of the Check at issue in this litigation.
1.

Ms. Pearson's testimony should not have been admitted.

Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. LR.E. 402. As discussed, "relevant
evidence" is that which has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." LR.E. 401.
Accordingly, "[e ]vidence of an extra-judicial experiment will be excluded unless the
conditions under which the experiment was conducted are shown to be substantially similar to those
existing at the time the accident occurred." Hansen v. Howard 0. lvfiller, Inc., 93 Idaho 314, 318,
460 P.2d 739, 743 (1969).
CitiMortgage argues that Ms. Pearson's experiment was "substantially similar" to the
original event and any variances from the original event were "[not] material, if any such variances
exist at all." Respondent's Brief at 21. This contention is without merit The circumstances of Ms.
Pearson's experiment and instruments employed therein bore only an extremely superficial similarity
to the events whereby the images of the Check at issue were created. The dissimilarities between the
experiment and the actual event are so substantial as to sunder Ms. Pearson's testimony of any
probative value whatsoever.
Ms. Pearson's experiment consisted of simply using the "Sharp copy machine" installed at
the office ofCitiMortgage's counsel, Pickens Law, P.A., to create scanned images of blank Pickens
Law checks (the afore-defined "Pickens Checks"). Ms. Pearson stapled blank checks, removed the
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staples with a claw, and fed it through the copy machine. See Tr. 189-90.
On the other hand, the U.S. Bank Check Image was created by extremely specialized and
sophisticated state-of-the-art machinery.

Mr. Powers established the specifications of such

machinery:
Q.

[Mr. Copple] Can you describe just very briefly how this imaging process
occurs physically?

A.

[Mr. Powers] The imaging process in 2005, U.S. Bank would have
employed IBM 3890/97 sorter camera combinations. These are incredibly
expensive machines. They were new technology in 2005. The machines can
capture the front and rear image of a check at a rate of about 2,000 items a
minute. The machines have a camera module that have highly sophisticated
lenses, and those lenses are kept inside, basically, environmental safe boxes
where they're humidity controlled, dust controlled and, more importantly,
light controlled. So the image snapshot of front and rear of the check would
occur inside what we call the coffin or the environmental controlled box
where the lenses reside.

Q.

So is there a camera on top and a camera below the check?

A.

That's exactly right

Q.

And how does it slide? Does it slide on glass or how does it -- how do you
get an image of both sides simultaneously?

A.

The check is physically forwarded through the equipment on belts and
rollers. The image coffin or the box, it's about the size of a shoebox, is glass.
And the check simply slides across that glass and then is picked up again at
the end of the glass and re-fed through the subsequent rollers and belts.

Q.

So -- and then the lights, what kind of lighting is used to take the picture?

A.

The lighting would be a specialized lens, probably a 1500 lumen type lens
front and rear. It was a white light in 2005. Technology has changed a little
since then, but in 2005 it would have been straight white light.

Tr. 135:12-136:18.
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Ms. Pearson did not establish that the Sharp office copier she used was similar to U.S.
Bank's machinery. She did not know the model of the copier. Tr. 202: 13-14. She did not know the
wattage of the bulb used. Tr. 202:22-24. Nor did she know the lumens produced by the bulb. Tr.
204:04-06. She did not know the speed of the printer's camera. Tr. 202:25-203:01. She did not
testify that the lenses are kept in environmental safe boxes which are humidity controlled, dust
controlled and, more importantly, light controlled which are the conditions under which the lenses of
U.S. Banks' machinery are kept. See Tr. 135:14-25. She did not testify that the light produced by
the camera was the same color as produced by U.S. Bank's machinery. CJTr. 136: 18 (Mr. Powers
discussing color oflight produced by U.S. Bank's machinery). Ms. Pearson did not testify that the
Pickens Checks entered Sharp copier on a system of belts and rollers as is used by U.S. Bank's
machinery. CJTr. l 36:07-12 (Mr. Powers describing how the Checks moved through U.S. Bank's
imaging machinery). In sum, Ms. Pearson laid absolutely no foundation from which the Court could
conclude that the circumstances of her experiment had any bearing or similarity to the original event
by which the Checks in this litigation were imaged. As Mr. Powers testified, comparing U.S. Bank's
imaging machinery to a run-of-the-mill office photocopier is as comparing "apples to oranges":
Q.

[Mr. Copple] And counsel questioned you about your ability to see any
staple holes in these checks. Can you describe to the Court the difference
between looking at a photocopied check versus looking at an imaged check in
the U.S. Bank system?

A.

[Mr. Powers] Well, the difference would be night and day.
The equipment deployed by U.S. Bank to capture check images is
somewhere in the neighborhood of over half a million dollars per camera.
The engineering is designed to support the Check Processing for the 21st
Century Act, which has a consequential damage clause to any problems with
the clearing of checks and check images. So the industry went to great
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lengths at high expense to get it right. So the comparison of an IBM 3890/97
camera at half a million dollars compared to a copy machine supplied photo,
I can't speak to those other than to say they're apples and orange
comparisons.
Tr. 185:20-186:11.
Furthermore, Ms. Pearson utterly failed to establish that the Pickens Checks were physically
compromised prior to imaging in the same way as the Check at issue. Ms. Pearson testified that the
staples had been removed from the Pickens Checks with a "claw" but CitiMortgage failed to
establish that alleged staples in the Checks at issue were removed in the same way. Tr. 204: 16-17.
Ms. Pearson only used that single method to remove the staple and did her experiment did not
include images of checks where the staples had been removed using every reasonable method. Tr.
204: 18-20. There was also no testimony that Ms. Pearson had used staples of varying gauges in
order to ensure that the staple holes would be the same size as in the original event.
"Evidence of extra-judicial experiments will be excluded unless the conditions under which
the experiment was conducted are shown to be substantially similar to those existing at the time" of
the original event.

See Lopez v. Allen, 96 Idaho 866, 871, 538 P.2d 1170, 1175 (1975).

CitiMortgage's contention that Ms. Pearson's experiment and the original event were "substantially
similar" is preposterous. Accordingly, the District court abused its discretion by admitting and
considering Ms. Pearson's testimony.

2.

The District Court should have deemed Ms. Pearson's testimony of no weight.

If evidence of an extra-judicial experiment is not wholly excluded, any differences between
the experiment and the actual event at issue go to the weight of the evidence. See Hansen at 318,
460 P.2d at 743. In light of the substantial differences between Ms. Pearson's experiment and the
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actual events whereby the Check Images were created, the District Court erred in affording Ms.
Pearson's testimony any weight whatsoever.
Firstly, it is critical to note that Ms. Pearson is not an expert in banking industry check
imaging nor does she have any training, experience, or qualifications whatsoever in that field. See
Tr. 199-204. As illustrated by the testimony of Keith Powers, the process of check imaging, its
industry and legal requirements, and the machinery involved are highly complex. See Tr. 125:05143: 15. Ms. Pearson was wholly incapable of performing any experiment which could generate any
facts the least bit useful to an analysis of a bank-imaged check and unqualified to offer any
testimony comparing her experiment to the actual event. Accordingly, her testimony should have
been accorded no weight whatsoever.
Moreover, Ci ti Mortgage mistakenly focuses on DPSI (Le., image resolution) to the exclusion
of all other considerations, offering the hollow sentiment that any variances were immaterial "given
the obvious simplicity of the narrow question at hand (whether a staple hole could be refilled so as to
be unseen on a 400 DPSI copy)." Respondent's Brief at 22. However, as established by Mr.
Powers' testimony, a great deal more than image resolution is implicated (i.e., camera speed, the
means by which the checks entered the machine, bulb wattage and brightness, light color, the
conditions under which the lenses are kept, etc.). See Tr. 135:12-136:18.
Might the Court indulge an analogy: CitiMortgage's suggestion that the only material
consideration is image resolution is akin to suggesting that all high definition televisions produce a
viewing image ofidentical quality regardless of brand, quality, age, or components. Clearly such a
contention does not withstand even brief scrutiny.

APPELLANT-CROSS RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF

- 15 -

Moreover, as discussed hereinabove, the District Court did not address (nor has
CitiMortgage) Ms. Pearson's failure to establish that the Pickens Checks underwent the same or
similar physical treatment prior to being imaged. See infra, pp. 13-14.
Despite the foregoing, the District Court cited Ms. Pearson's testimony extensively in its
findings (R. 1167-68, (FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA w, pp. 8-9)) and clearly afforded
it substantial weight; though CitiMortgage presented absolutely no other evidence that the Check
Images might conceal the existence of staple holes, the District Court nevertheless found it "more
probable than not that staple holes were on the Check." Id. at 1 I 68.
In light of the foregoing, the District Court abused its discretion in both admitting Ms.
Pearson's testimony and weighing it so heavily.
E.

CitiMortgage failed to prove that the Release Demand Letter was stapled and delivered
by a preponderance of the evidence.

As discussed, the testimony of CitiMortgage' s witness Ms. Pearson was neither relevant nor
credible. Beyond Ms. Pearson's testimony, CitiMortgage has set forth no affirmative evidence to
establish the probability of actual delivery. CitiMortgage did not produce any witness to testify that
they personally had delivered the Release Demand Letter or had any knowledge that it had in fact
been delivered.
CitiMortgage characterizes Mr. Powers' testimony as affirming the "possibility' that staple
holes were on the actual Check. Respondent's Brief at 25. Mr. Powers' actual testimony is far less
favorable:
Q.

[Ms. Pickens] Is it possible, Mr. Powers, if you took a look on page 15, that there
could have been a staple hole anywhere in this black version of "Endorse Here" or
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anywhere in the white version of the "Endorse Here"? Is it possible that there
could be a staple hole that would not be detected in the scan?
A.

[Mr. Powers] Possible? I guess.

Tr. 175: 10-16. As demonstrated by Mr. Powers' tepid response to the foregoing inquiry, Mr.
Powers' entire testimony serves to emphasize CitiMortgage's misplaced reliance on possibility as
opposed to probability. To that point, Mr. Powers elaborated on re-direct:
Q.

[Mr. Copple] Counsel also asked you if it was possible that staple holes could
somehow be present in the "Endorse Here" designation on the reverse side of the
check. Do you recall that question?

A.

[Mr. Powers] I do.

Q.

And you said it's possible. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not it's probable
or not?

A.

The image on Page 21 I would say it's highly improbable. The image on Page 33 I
would say it's possible.

Q.

And why is it improbable on 21?

A.

At 400 zoom, 21 looks very clear, and knowing the U.S. Bank equipment like I
do, if there were holes in that check, I'm confident that it's highly probable that
light would have come through the document.

Q.

Then directing your attention to 33.

A.

Page 33, I would have to say that it's possible, because I have no knowledge of the
First Bank of Idaho equipment in 2005.

Q.

And that's the only reason you say it's possible?

A.

That's correct.

Tr. 183:17-184:13 (emphasis added). Mr. Powers also testified that while "various dots" on the
Check "could be staple marks" (Respondent's Brief at25), those specks not align on the front and
back of the Check Images and therefore it was his opinion that they are not staple marks. Tr.
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182:11-183:16.
Recognizing the weakness ofits evidence of staple holes, CitiMortgage attempts to downplay
the importance of staple holes by emphasizing that "the visibility of staple holes was not dispositive
to the trial court's ruling." Respondent's Brief at 25. However, the District Court itself emphasized
that the issue was critical to its determination:
This is very important to me, it hasn't been raised, this is an issue for trial: Does the
check have staple marks on it? I don't know. You hire a forensic analyst,
photography analyst, bank analyst, get the best image you can.
Tr. 64:16-20.
Moreover, in the absence of any evidence of staple holes, the sum of the CitiMortgage's
remaining evidence relied upon by the District Court in finding that the Release Demand Letter was
delivered amounts to no more 2 than the following:
•

The title company's testimony that it "always" stapled payoff checks to demands for
reconveyance (see, e.g., R. 441) (though no BCT employee was able to confirm that
anyone had actually done so in this instance);

•

A U.S. Bank internal email which states "We didn't have the controls like we do

today on HELOCS" (see Defendant's Ex. 513) (though CitiMortgage offered no
context or evidence that HELOC "controls'' affected US Bank's document-receipt
and record-keeping given US Bank's extensive affirmative evidence establishing the
regularity of their own document-receipt and record-keeping procedures).
See R. 1164-69 (FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA w, pp. 5-10, setting forth District
Court's findings re: delivery of the Release Demand Letter). Thus the failure to prove that the

2

CitiMortgage recites a number of facts establishing that it was the intention of CitiMortgage and the Thomases that
the U.S. Bank Line of Credit be closed. From these facts CitiMortgage contends the District Court was able to infer
delivery of the Release Demand Letter. See Respondent's Brief at 12. However the intent of the parties to the
CitiMortgage Loan are not in dispute and none of these facts have any bearing on whether the Release Demand
Letter was or was not actually delivered to U.S. Bank by BCT on November 29, 2005.
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Release Demand Letter was stapled to the Check is damning to CitiMortgage's case.
The foregoing simply does not amount to proof of delivery by a preponderance of the
evidence. "[W]here there is any doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having
the burden of proof fails upon that issue." Whalen v. Vallier, 46 Idaho 181, 266 P. 1089, 1092
( 1928). CitiMortgage suggested many possibilities but utterly failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
establish the probability of actual delivery. Accordingly, the District Court erred in finding that the
Release Demand Letter was stapled and delivered to U.S. Bank on November 29, 2005.

F.

U.S. Bank proved that the Release Demand Letter was not delivered by a
preponderance of the evidence.
As discussed, it was CitiMortgage's burden to prove delivery of the Release Demand Letter;

it was not U.S. Bank's burden to prove non-delivery. Since CitiMortgage failed to meet its burden,
U.S. Bank was under no obligation to prove non-delivery. However, U.S. Bank nevertheless
adduced more than sufficient evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Release Demand Letter was not delivered.
U.S. Bank affirmatively established that:
•

Staple marks are clearly evident and distinct from dust specks on the comparative
bank-imaged checks provided by U.S. Bank. See R. 649-53.

•

No U.S. Bank employee has been located who has any memory of receiving the
Release Demand Letter. See R. 376-79, 419-30.

•

No one at BCT recalls delivering the Release Demand Letter. See R. 694-96 (Seal
Dep. 66-67); R. 703 (Osenga Dep. 26:02-05); R. 715 (Fauth Dep. 28:24-29:02).

•

A probable reason that the Release Demand Letter is undated is that its preparer was
too hurried to notice a possible computer glitch. R. 717 (Fauth Dep. 35:10-23).

•

BCT was conducting more transactions than at any time in its history at the time in
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question. See R. 714-15 (Fauth Dep. 25-26).
•

BCT obtained a formal payoff statement from the Thomases' other secured lender,
PHH Mortgage Services, but not U.S. Bank. See Appellant's Brief at 22 (citing R.
755-56).

•

Accordingly, the demands for reconveyance which were delivered via Federal
Express, rather than hand-delivery, to PHH Mortgage Services arrived at their
destination with no problems.

•

BCT never took any subsequent action to obtain reconveyance of the U.S. Bank
Deed of Trust. See Appellant's Brief at 22-23.

•

BCT was under pressure to quickly close the CitiMortgage Loan Transaction. See
Appellant's Brief at 23-24 (citing R. 765- 67).

•

BCT had no formal procedures for hand-delivering documents such as the Release
Demand Letter. See Appellant's Brief at 14-15 (citing R. 720 (Fauth Dep. 45:04-13);
see also R. 693 (Seal Dep. 64:18-65:22); R. 701 (Osenga Dep. 24:21-25:01)).

•

Accordingly, problems with BCT's hand-delivery of documents are not unheard of.
See Appellant's Brief at 23 (citing R. 720 (Fauth Dep. 46-47).

•

BCT has no proof of delivery of the Release Demand Letter. See Appellant's Brief
at 14-15.

•

U.S. Bank did have established procedures for receiving and filing checks and related
loan documentation. See Appellant's Brief at 15-16 (citing R. 619-24, 628; R. 1165).

•

The Release Demand Letter is the only document alleged to be missing from U.S.
Bank's records regarding this loan

The foregoing evidence is not based on possibility; these are established and uncontradicted
facts. In conjunction with Keith Powers' testimony regarding the functionality of U.S. Bank's
imaging machinery and his opinion, informed by unrivaled knowledge and experience regarding
check imaging, that the Check at issue was not delivered, U.S. Bank's evidence very clearly
outweighs CitiMortgage' sand proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the Release Demand
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Letter was not delivered.

G.

The District Court properly denied CitiMortgage its attorney's fees and costs.
The District Court correctly declined to award CitiMortgage its attorneys' fees pursuant to

LC.§§ 45-915 and 45-1514 because (a) CitiMortgage has failed to establish that U.S. Bank refused
to reconvey its deed of trust in bad faith, and (b) the statutes do not provide an avenue for the
recovery of attorneys' fees by a third-party lender such as CitiMortgage.
The District Court correctly declined to award CitiMortgage its costs pursuant to LC. § 101210 or attorneys' fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-121 because U.S. Bank's prosecution of this action was
not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
1.

CitiMortgage should not be awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to J.C.§§ 45-915
and 45-1514 because (a) CitiMortgage has failed to establish that U.S. Bank
refused to reconvey its deed of trust in bad faith, and (b) the statutes do not
provide an avenue for the recovery of attorneys' fees by a third-party lender
such as CitiMortgage.

CitiMortgage seeks to recover attorneys' fees pursuant to LC.§ 45-1514 via LC.§ 45-915.
This Court has stated that attorneys' fees are to be considered an item of damage recoverable by
mortgagors under LC. § 45-915. See Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196, 279 P.2d 1064 (I 955).
However, CitiMortgage's fees were properly denied under foregoing statutes because (a)
CitiMortgage has failed to establish that U.S. Bank refused to reconvey its deed of trust in bad faith;
and (b) Section 45-915 may not be asserted by a party who is not the "mortgagor, purchase, or his
grantee or heirs."
i. U.S. Bank's refusal to release its deed of trust was in good faith and therefore U.S.
Bank cannot be subject to the penalties provided by LC. § 45-915.
This Court has stated that a mortgagee may only be subject to the penalties provided by LC.§
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45-915 if its refusal to release the mortgage is in bad faith. Because U.S. Bank's refusal was not in
bad faith, it is not subject to any penalty under the statute.
This Court has consistently repeated the foregoing principal. In Head v. Crone, this Court
said:
Respondent urges that if a bona fide controversy exists between the mortgagor and
mortgagee over the amounts due, and mortgagee's refusal to release the mortgage is
in good faith, the mortgagee is not liable to mortgagor. Such is the rule relating to
recovery of the penalty provided by I.C. § 45-915.
76 Idaho at 200,279 P.2d at 1066 (citing Platts v. Pacific First Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n, 62
Idaho 340, 111 P.2d 1093 (1941); Harding v. Home Inv. & Sav. Co., 49 Idaho 64,286 P. 920,297 P.
1101 ( 1930)) (emphasis added); see also Platts, 62 Idaho at 341 ("There was a good faith and bona
fide controversy existing between the mortgagors and the mortgagee... It would have been
inequitable to impose [LC.§ 45-915's] penalty under the circumstances of the case"). "Bad faith is
defined as dishonesty in belief or purpose." Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint Sch. Dist. No. 93,
144 Idaho 637, 643, 167 P.3d 774, 780 (2007).
Likewise in this case, U.S. Bank's refusal to release its deed of trust was not due to
dishonesty in belief or purpose, but rather due to a sincere belief that it had not received a demand
for reconveyance (i.e., the Release Demand Letter). Because the U.S. Bank Line of Credit held by
the Thomases was a home equity revolving line of credit rather than an ordinary mortgage, simply
paying down the balance was insufficient under the terms of the Equiline Agreement and U.S. Bank
Deed of Trust a request for reconveyance was necessary. After the Thomases caused the balance
on their U.S. Bank credit account to be paid down with the proceeds of the CitiMortgage loan, the
Thomases resumed borrowing and U.S. Bank advanced over $2 million to the Thomases based upon
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U

Bank's belief in the continuing validity of its deed of trust Since U.S. Bank has at all times

possessed the sincere belief that it did not receive the Release Demand Letter on November 29,
2005, there existed a bona fide controversy which required judicial determination of the issue. Thus,
in light of the bona fide controversy, U.S. Bank's actions were in good faith and it would be
inequitable to allow attorneys' fees as damages under LC. § 45-915. Accordingly, U.S. bank
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District Court's denial of CitiMortgage's request for
attorneys' fees.
11.

CitiMortgage may not avail itself of the remedies provided by LC. § 45-915
because it is not a "mortgagor, purchaser, or his grantee or heirs."

LC.§ 45-915 3 provides that any holder of a mortgage who fails to release the mortgage upon
satisfaction and demand "is liable to the mortgagor, purchaser, or his grantee or heirs, for all
damages which he or they may sustain by reason of such refusal." See LC. § 45-915 (emphasis
added). CitiMortgage is not "mortgagor, purchaser, or his grantee or heirs" therefore cannot assert
Section 45-915 against U.S. Bank.
A mortgagor is"[o ]ne who mortgages property; the mortgage-debtor, or borrower. BLACK'S
LA w DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). It is undisputable that CitiMortgage is not the mortgagee in this
case. Nor could CitiMortgage reasonably argue that it is a "purchaser" or "heir."
Accordingly, CitiMortgage argued to the District Court that it was entitled to an award of
fees as a "grantee" of Defendants Herbert and Julie Thomas under the CitiMortgage Deed of Trust.
3

J.C. § 45-915 is injected herein through LC. § 45- 1514 which specifically pertains to reconveyance of deeds of trust
securing an obligation. As CitiMortgage correctly states, the statutes are to be read in pari materia. See Brinton v.
Haight, 125 Idaho 324, 332, 870 P.2d 677, 685 (Ct. App. 1994). LC. § 45-1514 states that a trustee obligated to
reconvey its deed of trust but which refuses shall be "liable as provided by law." It is J.C. § 45-915 which is
incorporated through Section 45-1514 to provide the penalties referenced therein. Thus, U.S. Bank can only be liable for
damages (i.e., attorney's fees) under Section 45-1514 if CitiMortgage is a proper party under Section 45-9 I 5.
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However both authority and common sense dictate that CitiMortgage cannot be a "grantee" for the
purposes ofl.C. § 45-915.
This Court has specifically stated that LC.§ 45-915 is "to be strictly construed." Henderson
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 65 Idaho 570, 149 P.2d 133, 135 (1943). "Statutory interpretation

begins with the literal words of the statute, giving the language its plain, obvious and rational
meaning." Hayes v. Kingston, 140 Idaho 551, 553, 96 P.3d 652, 654 (2004). "Where a statute or
constitutional provision is clear, the Court must follow the law as written and, thus, when the
language is unambiguous, there is no occasion for application for rules of construction." Id (citing
Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135,138,804 P.2d 308, 31 l (1990)).

The plain meaning of the literal words of LC.§ 45-915 limits the class of parties who may
seek attorneys' fees to those in privity with the mortgagee. The statute states:
When any mortgage, affecting the title to real property, has been satisfied, the holder
thereof or his assignee must immediately, on the demand of the mortgagor,
purchaser, or the successor in interest of either, execute, acknowledge, and deliver
to him a certificate of the discharge thereof so as to entitle it to be recorded, or he
must enter satisfaction or cause satisfaction of such mortgage or affecting the title to
real property, to be entered of record; and any holder, or assignee of such holder,
who refuses to execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the mortgagor, purchaser, or
the successor in interest of either, the certificate of discharge, or to enter
satisfaction, or cause satisfaction of the mortgage to be entered, as provided in this
chapter, is liable to the mortgagor, purchaser, or his grantee or heirs, for all
damages which he or they may sustain by reason of such refusal, and shall also
forfeit to him or them the sum of $100.
LC. § 45-915 (emphasis added). Those persons set forth as having rights under this section
are the "mortgagor," "purchaser," mortgagor or purchaser's "successor in interest," and the
mortgagor or purchaser's "grantee" and "heirs." These terms describe persons who purchase, are
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gifted, inherit, or otherwise acquire the property. Parties fitting these descriptions would necessarily
be in privity with the mortgagee 4.
CitiMortgage attempts to ascribe an illogical and inconsistent meaning to "grantee" in order
to shoehorn itself into Section 45-915 despite being merely a beneficiary of a totally unrelated deed
of trust. Thus, CitiMortgage asked the District Court to infer CitiMortgage's desired definition of
"grantee" in light of the definition of "grantor" set forth in the IDAHO DEED OF TRUST ACT (LC. § 451502 through -1515, the "Act"). Significantly, the Act does not define "grantee." It does, however,
define "grantor" as "the person conveying real property." CitiMortgage argued to the District Court
that it was "the person who was conveyed real property by deed of trust" and therefore it must be the
grantee. See R. 1300 (CitiMortgage's RESPONSE TO U.S. BANK'SMOTIONTODISALLOWCOSTSAND
ATTORNEY FEES, p. 6). This argument is fatally flawed for two reasons: first, I.C. § 45-1502's
definitions apply exclusively to the Act and are not controlling of LC § 45-915; and second, the
Ci ti Mortgage Deed of Trust did not convey the real property to CitiMortgage.
The former of these points speaks for itself: LC. § 45-1502 expressly states that the terms
therein are defined solely "[a]s used in this act." See I.C. § 45-1502. Thus it is clear that these
definitions do not constrain this Court's interpretation of LC. §45-915.
However, though the definitions ofl.C. § 45-1502 are not controlling, the statute's mechanics
nevertheless preclude CitiMortgage from being considered a grantee in any sense. Under LC. § 451502, only the trustee receives any conveyance in a deed of trust. Ci ti Mortgage is not the trustee of

4

Or trust deed holder in a case such as this where J.C. § 45-915 is applied through LC.§ 45-1514.
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the CitiMortgage Deed of Trust; BCT is the trustee. CitiMortgage is merely the beneficiary. The
statute defines each party and the scope of each party's interest as follows:
As used in this act:
( 1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as
the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest, and
who shall not be the trustee.
(2) "Grantor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed as security
for the performance of an obligation.
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with this act and conveying
real property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an obligation of the
grantor or other person named in the deed to a beneficiary.
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom the legal title to real property is conveyed
by trust deed, or his successor in interest.
LC. § 45-1502 (emphasis added). Note that the statute explicitly states that the grantor "conveys"
the real property as security to the trustee (BCT); not the beneficiary (CitiMortgage). 5
However, though the trustee does receive a "conveyance" of title, the trustee is nevertheless
not a "grantee." This Court has clarified that neither the beneficiary nor trustee of a deed of trust
actually receive any legal estate in the property. See Long v. Williams, I 05 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d
I 048 (1983). While legal title is conveyed to the trustee (BCT), this is solely for the purpose of
security. See id. at 587-88, 671 P.2d at 1050-51. The trustee receives nothing more than an
executory power of sale capable of exercise only upon occurrence of certain contingencies. The
trustor (Thomases) and their successors retain the sole legal estate in the property. See id.

It is significant that the Legislature chose not to employ or define the term "grantee" in the Idaho Deed of Trust Act.
This is likely because doing so would create a new definition of"grantee" inconsistent with the term's usual meaning.
5
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In light of the foregoing, it is unsurprising that U.S. Bank is unable to locate a single Idaho
case brought against a mortgagee/lender under LC. § 45-915 by a third party lacking privity. 6 It thus
appears that Idaho appellate courts have not had occasion to interpret LC.§ 45-915 in this context,
which itself demonstrates that CitiMortgage's attempt to avail itself of the statute is prohibited.
Cases in other jurisdictions confirm that the benefit of the statute runs only to the mortgagor. For
example, the Supreme Court of Utah discussed the point in Draper v. JB. & R.E Walker, Inc., 115
Utah 368,204 P.2d 826 (1949) and concluded that the scope of the analogous Utah statute, 78-3-8
U.C.A. 1943 7, was "clearly limited to the mortgagee-mortgagor relationship." Draper, 204 P.2d at
830.
In Draper, plaintiff Draper owned certain land in Salt Lake County. Draper's neighbor, Old
Mill Tavern, Inc. claimed title to Draper's lands by virtue of certain tax and sale proceedings, upon
which Old Mill Tavern recorded tax deeds to the property. Old Mill Tavern then executed a
mortgage on the property in favor of defendant Walker. Thereafter, Old Mill Tavern's claim to the

See Brinton v. Haight, 125 Idaho 324, 329, 870 P.2d 677,682 (Ct. App. 1994)(1.C. § 45-1514 asserted as defense by
mortgagors); Dohrman v. Tomlinson, 88 Idaho 313, 399 P.2d 255 ( 1965) (action under LC. § 45-915 brought by
mortgagor); Headv. Crone, 79 Idaho 544,324 P.2d 996 (1958) (action brought by mortgagor); Headv. Crone, 76 Idaho
196,279 P.2d 1064 (1955) (action brought by mortgagor); Henderson, 65 Idaho 570, 149 P.2d 133 (action brought by
mortgagor); Platts v. Pac. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n of Tacoma, 62 Idaho 340, I I I P.2d 1093 (1941) (action brought
by mortgagor); Cornelison v. US. Bldg. & loan Ass 'n, 50 Idaho I, 292 P. 243 ( 1930) (action brought by mortgagor);
Blackfoot State Bankv. Crisler, 20 Idaho 379, 118 P. 775 (1911) (statute 6 asserted as defense by mortgagor); Macholdv.
Farnan, 20 Idaho 80, 117 P. 408,409 ( 1911) (action brought by mortgagor); Clevelandv. W. loan & Sav. Co., 7 Idaho
477, 63 P. 885 ( 190 I) (action brought by mortgagor); Barnes v. Pitts Agric. Works, 6 ldaho 259, 55 P. 237 (1898) (action
brought by mortgagor); Stevens v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Idaho 741, 51 P. 779 (1898) (action brought by
mortgagor).
6

' 78-3-8 U.C.A. 1943: "If the mortgagee fails to discharge or release any mortgage after the same has been fully
satisfied, he shall be liable to the mortgagor for double the damages resulting from such failure. Or the mortgagor may
bring an action against the mortgagee to compel the discharge or release of the mortgage after the same has been
satisfied; and the judgment of the court must be that the mortgagee discharge or release the mortgage and pay the
mortgagor the costs of suit, and all damages resulting from such failure."
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property was declared invalid and title was quieted in favor of Draper. Later, Draper brought suit
against defendant Walker, with whom Draper had no legal relationship, for Walker's refusal to
release its mortgage on the property. Draper sought damages pursuant to 78-3-8 U.C.A. 1943.
Draper, 204 P.2d at 827-828.

The Utah Supreme Court noted that the statute had modified "the common law rule denying
recovery of damages where defendant refuses to release or discharge a mortgage, lien, or claim
against real property .... " Draper, 204 P.2d at 829. Thus the Court stated:
We conclude that by limiting the relief to the mortgagor the legislature intended
that the common law rule should be controlling in other instances. We are convinced
the facts and circumstances of this case do not bring plaintiff within any rule of
common law which would permit him to recover damages.
Id. at 830 (emphasis added).

As in Draper, CitiMortgage is a third party with whom the mortgagee, U.S. Bank, has no
relationship. The clear and unambiguous language of LC. § 45-915 gives a cause of action only to a
"mortgagor, purchaser, or his grantee or heirs" and there is no precedent for extending application of
this statute beyond the limited relationship intended by the Idaho legislature.

Accordingly,

CitiMortgage may not seek to recover its attorneys' fees under LC.§§ 45-915 and 45-1514 therefore
the District Court properly denied CitiMortgage's request for attorneys' fees.

2.

CitiMortgage should not be awarded fees or costs pursuant to I.C. § 10-1210 or
I.C. § 12-121 because U.S. Bank's prosecution of this action was not frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.

CitiMortgage seeks to recover its discretionary costs under LC.§ 10-1210 and attorneys' fees
pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. CitiMortgage should be denied costs and fees under these statutes because
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U.S. Bank has not pursued this litigation frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 8
Fees under LC.§ 12-121 are not awarded as a matter of right but are subject to the trial
court's discretion. Nampa Charter Sch., Inc. v. DeLaPaz, 140 Idaho 23, 29, 89 P.3d 863, 869
(2004). "Attorney's fees are awarded under [LC.§ 12-121] only when 'the action was brought or
pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."' Mc Lean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 15 3
Idaho 425,283 P.3d 742, 749 (2012)(quoting Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 751, 979 P.2d 619,
624 (1999)). "The entire course of the litigation must be taken into account and if there is at
least one legitimate issue presented, attorney fees may not be awarded even though the losing
party has asserted other factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation." Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 289-90, 246 P.3d 391, 398-99 (2010) (quoting
Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,235,220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009)) (emphasis added).

In this case, the notion that U.S. Bank's pursuit of this litigation frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation is absurd. U.S. Bank instituted judicial foreclosure to recover upon a debt in
excess of $2 million which. The validity of the claim was ultimately stipulated to by the Thomases
themselves.
As discussed, U.S. Bank's refusal to release its deed of trust was not due to dishonesty in
belief or purpose, but rather due to a sincere belief that it had not received the Release Demand
Letter. See infra, p. 21.

Accordingly, U.S. Bank was forced to protect its first lien priority where

another lender (CitiMortgage) claimed senior priority based on a demand for reconveyance which

8 CitiMortgage

incorporates its argument in favor of an award of attorneys' fees under LC.§ 12-121 as grounds for an
award of its discretionary costs under LC.§ 10-1210. Thus, U.S. Bank focuses on the analysis under Section 12-121, it
being dispositive of both issues.
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U.S. Bank to this day has no record of receiving. Whether BCT actually did deliver the Release

Demand Letter turned out to be an exceptionally close question. U.S. Bank went to great lengths to
thoroughly describe to the Court all of its relevant procedures and present the facts and
circumstances that demonstrated how truly unlikely it was that the Release Demand Letter had been
delivered regardless of whether staple holes existed in the electronic copies of the checks.
Nevertheless, in denying both U.S. Bank and CitiMortgage's motions for summary judgment, the
Court deemed that a trial was necessary to fully resolve the matter. Claims which this Court has
determined to present "genuine issues of material fact" cannot be frivolous.
In light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that U.S. Bank's need to seek a judicial
determination with regard to priority was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation and that
U.S. Bank proceeded in this litigation in good faith at all times. Accordingly, CitiMortgage's fees

and costs under LC.§ 10-1210 and LC.§ 12-121 were properly denied by the District Court. U.S.
Bank respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District Court's ruling.

H.

CitiMortgage is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal because
U.S. Bank's appeal has not been brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation.
Regardless of whether U.S. Bank is ultimately successful, there can be no denial that there is

adequate grounds for U.S. Bank's appeal of the District Court's finding that the Release Demand
Letter was delivered. Accordingly, Ci ti Mortgage's request for an award ofattorneys' fees on appeal
should be denied.
IDAHO APPELL;\ TE RULES

(I.AR.) 40 and 41 allow for an award of costs and attorneys' fees

to the prevailing party. Attorneys' fees on appeal are appropriate under I.AR. 41 if the appellate
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court is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634,638
(1990). An award of attorneys' fees is appropriate if the law is well settled and the appellant has
made no substantial showing that the lower court misapplied the law, or on review of discretion, no
cogent challenge is presented with regard to the trial judge's exercise of discretion. Pass v. Kenny,
118 Idaho 445,449, 767 P.2 153, 157 (Ct. App. 1990); Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 829
P.2d 1361, 1367 (Ct. App. 1991).
In the present case, U.S. Bank has asserted numerous compelling grounds for challenging the
District Court's findings including (I) the failure by the District Court to consider crucial evidence,
(2) inferring facts not supported by the evidence, (3) admitting and considering unqualified and
irrelevant testimony, and (4) misallocating the burden of proof Given the narrow questions at issue,
each one of these errors by itself provides ample grounds for reversing the District Court's decision.
U.S. Bank believes that all of these errors combined yield the abiding conclusion that the District
Court's findings abused its discretion and committed substantial and reversible error in finding that
the Release Demand Letter was delivered and that CitiMortgage was thus entitled to first lien
position.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that U.S. Bank has brought this appeal frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Therefore U.S. Bank respectfully requests that CitiMortgage
be denied its attorneys' fees on appeal.
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I.

U.S. Bank is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees and costs on cross-appeal
because CitiMortgage's cross-appeal has been brought frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation.
As discussed, attorneys' fees on appeal are appropriate under I.A.R. 41 if the appellate court

is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably,
or without foundation. Durrant, 117 Idaho at 74, 785 P.2d at 638. An award of attorneys' fees is
appropriate if the law is well settled and the appellant has made no substantial showing that the
lower court misapplied the law, or on review of discretion, no cogent challenge is presented with
regard to the trial judge's exercise of discretion. Pass, 118 Idaho at 449, 767 P.2 at 157.
In the present case, CitiMortgage is vigorously arguing that the District Court's decision to
deny CitiMortgage its attorneys' fees should be reversed. CitiMortgage erroneously argues that is
entitled to fees under a statute which clearly does not list a competing lender as a viable party.
Further, CitiMortgage offers the contradictory argument that a case which, by CitiMortgage's own
admission was based on conflicting evidence, did not present a bona fide dispute. Because
CitiMortgage has brought this cross-appeal unreasonably and without foundation, has made no
substantial showing that the District Court misapplied the law, and has failed to cogently challenge
the District Court's exercise of discretion, U.S. Bank should be entitled its attorneys' fees on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, U.S. Bank respectfully requests that it be awarded attorneys' fees
on appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, U.S. Bank respectfully requests (1) that the Court reverse
the District Court's ruling that U.S. Bank's deed of trust be subordinated to that ofCitiMortgage; (2)
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that the Court affirm

District Court's denial of CitiMortgage's attorney's fees; (3) deny

CitiMortgage an award of its attorney's fees and costs on appeal; and (4) award U.S. Bank it's
attorney's fees and costs incurred in responding to CitiMortgage's cross-appeaL
DATED this 28 th day of January, 2014.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE, LLP

/r,:
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Terry C. C9pple, of the .fidif
AttorneySfor Plaintiff • "

By: _ _-i
Mic
E. Band, of the firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Pickens Law, P .A
P.O. Box 915
Boise, Idaho 83701
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E-Mail

Thomas E. Dvorak
Givens Pursley, LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
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E-Mail

Lee P. Ritzau
Luboviski, Wygle, Fallowfield & Ritzau, P.A.
P.O. Box 1172
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